Military Role Expansion
The army has four major roles or functions in the maintenance of public order and internal security. One is to defend India's territorial integrity and to maintain the inviolability of its borders. Another involves dealing with internal security threats stemming from secessionist demands and externally supported insurgencies. The army also is called upon to assist civilian authorities in maintaining civil order when local police forces and the paramilitary prove inadequate to the task. Finally, the army can also be mobilized to deal with natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods, the only domestic function that the army performs with enthusiasm.
Despite the existence of numerous paramilitary forces, the army has had to quell outbreaks of civil violence, primarily in the states of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab (see Paramilitary Forces and Reserve Forces, this ch.). By the early 1990s, army involvement in Assam and Punjab had diminished significantly as insurgencies waned. However, the role of the army in Jammu and Kashmir expanded substantially as both police and paramilitary forces failed to maintain law and order.
In 1993 upper-echelon army officers warned that excessive use of the army to restore civil order might have a number of corrosive effects. First, it might damage the morale of troops who might be distressed at having to shoot civilians. Second, it might have the effect of politicizing the army. The outgoing chief of army staff, General Sunith Francis Rodrigues, publicly articulated his misgivings on this subject. Furthermore, in June 1993, Rodrigues presented a report entitled "Maximizing Effectiveness of Central Police Organizations" to the Committee of Secretaries (composed of a "core group", the secretaries of defence, finance, and home affair, chaired by the cabinet secretary, and meeting on a weekly basis). The report called for the army to take over the training of paramilitary forces.
Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces
In response to a range of insurgencies since the early 1980s, the central government has enacted an extensive array of legislation that places substantial curbs on civil liberties. The National Security Act of 1980, the National Security Amendment Act of 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 (which was renewed in 1987 and suspended in 1995), and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990 are the most significant laws in force. The ramifications of these four laws are sweeping. Under their aegis, the central government has the right of preventive detention, may seek in-camera trials, may send accused individuals before designated courts, and may destroy property belonging to suspected terrorists. Furthermore, under the terms of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, members of the armed forces cannot be prosecuted for actions committed in good faith in pursuance of the provisions of this law.
During the 1980s and 1990s, both international and domestic human rights groups asserted that human rights violations are rampant. The principal international organizations making these allegations are the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Asia Watch. Two Indian counterparts are the People's Union for Civil Liberties and the People's United Democratic Front. Indian and foreign press reports have alleged that local police and paramilitary forces have engaged in rape, torture, and beatings of suspects in police custody. Numerous "militants" reportedly have simply disappeared in Jammu and Kashmir. On other occasions, especially in Punjab, security forces on various occasions allegedly captured insurgents and then shot them in staged "encounters" or "escapes." The government has either vigorously challenged these allegations or asserted that condign punishment had been meted out against offenders. The government has made efforts to blunt the barrage of domestic and foreign criticism. One such effort was the establishment of the five-member National Human Rights Commission in 1993 composed of senior retired judges. A report released by the commission in November 1993 cited eighty Bombay police officials for "atrocities, ill treatment, collusion, and connivance" and for "being openly on the side of the Hindu aggressors" during the December 1992 Hindu-Muslim riots. The commission's mandate does not extend to violations in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast India, and it must rely on state investigative agencies for its field work.
Kashmir
In the mid-1990s, India was grappling with three separate insurgencies of varying strengths in the states of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir has the most serious implications for India. The long-term roots of the Kashmir problem can be traced to the partition of India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The crisis centers on a militant secessionist demand that the Indian state has harshly suppressed. Its proximate causes are located in the central government's attempts to manipulate state-level politics for short-term political ends. Since 1989, approximately 10,000 civilians have died at the hands of security forces or militants. Although the origins of the crisis are quintessentially indigenous, there is widespread agreement among both Indian and foreign observers that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan has actively aided and abetted some of the insurgent groups, most notably, the radical Islamic Hezb-ul-Mujahideen.
The counterinsurgency strategy that the Indian government has adopted in Jammu and Kashmir was developed in the context of dealing with guerrilla movements in India's northeast in the late 1970s. This strategy involves denying the guerrillas any sanctuaries, sealing the porous Indo-Pakistani border, and using both army and paramilitary forces to conduct house-to-house "cordon-and-search" operations. Whether this strategy will lead eventually to the collapse of the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir remains an open question; violence has continued to accelerate since 1993, with mounting casualties on both sides and the destruction of an ancient mosque and shrine in 1995 (see Political Issues, ch. 8; South Asia, ch. 9).
Punjab
The insurgency in the state of Punjab originated in the late 1970s. The roots of this insurgency are complex. The Green Revolution, a package of agricultural inputs, transformed the socioeconomic landscape of Punjab (see The Green Revolution, ch. 7). Amidst this new-found prosperity, large numbers of Sikhs started to shed some of the trappings of their faith. This propensity rekindled an age-old fear in the Sikh community--that of being absorbed into the Hindu fold. In turn, many Punjabi Sikhs, who were dispossessed of their land as a consequence of agricultural transformation, found solace in various revivalistic practices. One of the leaders of this revivalistic movement was Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a politically ambitious itinerant Sikh preacher. The second factor contributing to the insurgency was the attempt by Indira Gandhi (India's prime minister, 1966-77 and 1980-84), the Congress, and from 1978 Congress (I) to use Bhindranwale to undermine the position of the Akali Dal (Eternal Party), a regional party (see Political Parties, ch. 8). Bhindranwale and his followers were encouraged to verbally intimidate Akali Dal politicians. Although this strategy met with some success, Bhindranwale and his followers became a source of mayhem and disruption in Punjab. Eventually, in June 1984, Gandhi had to order units of the Indian army to flush out Bhindranwale and his followers, who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple complex, Sikhism's most holy shrine, in Amritsar, Punjab (see Sikhism, ch. 3).
This exercise, Operation Bluestar, was, at best, a mixed success. After all efforts at negotiation failed, Indira Gandhi ordered the army to storm the temple. A variety of army units, along with substantial numbers of paramilitary forces, surrounded the temple complex on June 3, 1984. After the demands to surrender peacefully were met with volleys of gunfire from within the confines of the temple, the army was given the order to take the temple by force. Indian intelligence authorities had underestimated the firepower possessed by the militants, however, and the army brought in tanks and heavy artillery to suppress the antitank and machine-gun fire. After a twenty-four-hour firefight, the army successfully took control of the temple. According to Indian government sources, eighty-three army personnel were killed and 249 injured. Insurgent casualties were 493 killed and eighty-six injured. Indian observers assert that the number of Sikh casualties was probably higher.
The attack on the Golden Temple had the effect of inflaming significant segments of the Sikh community. It is widely believed that the two Sikh bodyguards who assassinated Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, were driven by their anger over the Golden Temple episode. In the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination, mobs rampaged through the streets of New Delhi and other parts of India over the next few days, killing several thousand Sikhs. The New Delhi police proved to be partisan observers and did little to stop or apprehend the rioters. Only after the deployment of the army, almost three days after the onset of the riots, was order fully restored.
The New Delhi riots had repercussions in Punjab as militants stepped up their activities. Gandhi's son and political successor, Rajiv Gandhi, sought unsuccessfully to bring peace to Punjab with an accord signed with Harchand Singh Longowal, a moderate Sikh leader. Rajiv Gandhi's successors, belonging to the Janata factions, proved to be no more adept at resolving the crisis. In fact, between 1987 and 1991, Punjab was placed under President's Rule and governed directly from New Delhi (see The Executive, ch. 8). Eventually, an election was held in the state in February 1992. Voter turnout, however, was poor; only about 24 percent of the population participated in the elections. Despite its narrow mandate, the newly elected Congress (I) government gave a free hand to the police chief of the state, K.P.S. Gill. His ruthless methods significantly weakened the insurgent movement. Most political observers, however, assert that long-term political stability in Punjab depends on addressing the underlying grievances of segments of the Sikh community.
Assam and the Northeast
The origins of the insurgency in Assam are quite different from those in Kashmir and Punjab. The principal grievance of the radical student movement, the United Liberation Front of Assam, is nativist. Front members are violently opposed to the presence of Bengalis from the neighboring state of West Bengal and waves of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Various rounds of negotiations between the United Liberation Front of Assam and two successive central governments resulted in the Assam Accord of August 15, 1985. Under the provisions of this accord, persons who entered the state illegally between January 1966 and March 1971 were allowed to remain but were disenfranchised for ten years, while those who entered after 1971 faced expulsion. A November 1985 amendment to the Indian citizenship law allows noncitizens who entered Assam between 1961 and 1971 to have all the rights of citizenship except the right to vote for a period of ten years.
In 1993 an accord was reached between the Bodo tribe and the central and state governments. The accord established the Bodoland Autonomous Council, which gave the Bodos limited political and administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, violence broke out in 1994: members of the Bodo Security Force, in the wake of demands for a "liberated Bodoland" burned several villages and killed around 100 immigrant villagers. Both local counterinsurgency forces and army units were sent in to engage the Bodo militants.
A number of other insurgencies in the northeast have required extensive use of army and paramilitary forces. Four states in particular have witnessed various insurgent and guerrilla movements. The first and perhaps the most significant insurgency originated in Nagaland in the early 1950s; it was eventually quelled in the early 1980s through a mixture of repression and cooptation. In 1993 Nagaland experienced recrudescent violence as two ethnic groups, the Nagas and the Kukis, engaged in brutal conflict with each other. Adding to India's internal unrest in this region were the links established between the Bodo insurgents in Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which, in turn, had links to other active insurgent groups and, reportedly, operatives in Thailand.
In neighboring Manipur, militants organized under the aegis of the People's Liberation Army long fought to unite the Meitei tribes of Burma and Manipur into an independent state. This insurgent movement had been largely suppressed by the mid-1990s.
In Mizoram the Mizo National Front fought a running battle with the Indian security forces throughout the 1960s. As in Nagaland, this insurgency was suppressed in the early 1980s through a mixture of political concessions and harsh military tactics.
In the state of Tripura, tribal peoples organized under the leadership of the Tripura National Front were also responsible for terrorist activity. This movement has, for the most part, also been brought under control by the government.
The central government's success in quelling these insurgencies was not without human and material costs. Although no assessments of these costs exist in the public domain, it is widely believed that the paramilitary forces and the army were given a free hand in suppressing the uprisings. A prominent Indian human rights activist and attorney, Nandita Haksar, has alleged that harsh methods were routinely used, including collective punishment of villagers accused of harboring terrorists in remote areas. Because of the continued level of insurgency by Assamese and other groups, which had bases in neighboring Burma, India and Burma started joint counterinsurgency operations against the rebels in May 1995, the first such operations since the 1980s.
National-Level Agencies
The constitution assigns responsibility for maintaining law and order to the states and territories, and almost all routine policing--including apprehension of criminals--is carried out by state-level police forces. The constitution also permits the central government to participate in police operations and organization by authorizing the maintenance of the Indian Police Service. Police officers are recruited by the Union Public Service Commission through a competitive nationwide examination. On completion of a nationwide basic public-service course, police officer candidates attend the National Police Academy at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. They are then assigned to particular state or union territory forces, where they usually remain for the rest of their careers. About 50 percent of the officers are regularly assigned to states or territories other than their own in an effort to promote national integration.
The constitution also authorizes the central government to maintain whatever forces are necessary to safeguard national security. Under the terms of the constitution, paramilitary forces can be legally detailed to assist the states but only if so requested by the state governments. In practice, the central government has largely observed these limits. In isolated instances, the central government has deployed its paramilitary units to protect central government institutions over the protest of a state government. During the Emergency of 1975-77, the constitution was amended (effective February 1, 1976) to permit the central government to dispatch and deploy its paramilitary forces without regard to the wishes of the states (see The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1). This action proved unpopular, and the use of the paramilitary forces was controversial. After the Emergency was lifted, the constitution was amended in December 1978 to make deployment of central government paramilitary forces once again dependent on the consent of the state government. According to apologists for the central government, this amendment prevented the government from sending in paramilitary forces to protect the Babri Masjid (Babri Mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in December 1992 (see Public Worship, ch. 3).
The principal national-level organization concerned with law enforcement is the Ministry of Home Affairs, which supervises a large number of government functions and agencies operated and administered by the central government. The ministry is concerned with all matters pertaining to the maintenance of public peace and order, the staffing and administration of the public services, the delineation of internal boundaries, and the administration of union territories.
In addition to managing the Indian Police Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs maintains several agencies and organizations dealing with police and security. Police in the union territories are the responsibility of the Police Division, which also runs the National Police Academy and the Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science. The Central Bureau of Investigation investigates crimes that might involve public officials or have ramifications for several states. The ministry also is the parent organization of the Border Security Force.
State and Other Police Services
The Police Act of 1861 established the fundamental principles of organization for police forces in India, and, with minor modifications, continues in effect. Consequently, although state-level police forces are separate and may differ in terms of the quality of equipment and resources, their patterns of organization and operation are markedly similar.
An inspector general, answerable to the home secretary of the state, heads each state, union territory, or national capital territory police force. Under the inspector general are a number of police "ranges" composed of three to six districts, headed by deputy inspectors general. District police headquarters are commanded by superintendents. District superintendents have wide discretionary powers and are responsible for overseeing subordinate police stations as well as specialty elements, such as criminal investigation detachments, equipment storehouses and armories, and traffic police. Many large districts also have several assistant district superintendents.
Most preventive police work is carried out by constables assigned to police stations. Depending on the number of stations there, a district may be subdivided and, in some states, further divided into police "circles" to facilitate the supervision from district headquarters. Most of the major metropolitan areas such as New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras have separate municipal forces headed by commissioners. Police in the states and union territories are assisted by units of volunteer Home Guards, maintained under guidelines formulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
In most states and territories, police forces are functionally divided into civil (unarmed) police and armed contingents. The former staff police stations, conduct investigations, answer routine complaints, perform traffic duties, and patrol the streets. They usually carry lathis --bamboo staffs weighted or tipped with iron.
Contingents of armed police are divided into two groups, the district armed police and the Provincial Armed Constabulary. The district armed police are organized along the lines of an army infantry battalion. They are assigned to police stations and perform guard and escort duties. Those states that maintain distinct armed contingents employ them as a reserve strike force for emergencies. Such units are organized either as a mobile armed force under direct state control or in the case of district armed police (who are not as well equipped) as a force directed by district superintendents and generally used for riot-control duty.
The Provincial Armed Constabulary (Pradeshik) is an armed reserve maintained at key locations in some states and active only on orders from the deputy inspector general and higher-level authorities. Armed constabulary are not usually in contact with the public until they are assigned to VIP duty or assigned to maintain order during fairs, festivals, athletic events, elections, and natural disasters. They may also be sent to quell outbreaks of student or labor unrest, organized crime, and communal riots; to maintain key guard posts; and to participate in antiterrorist operations. Depending on the type of assignment, the Provincial Armed Constabulary may carry only lathis .
At all levels, the senior police officers answer to the police chain of command and respond to the general direction and control of designated civilian officials. In the municipal force, the chain of command runs directly to the state home secretary rather than to the district superintendent or district officials.
Working conditions and pay are poor, especially in the lower echelons of the police forces. Recruits receive only around Rs1,900 per month (about US$64). Opportunities for promotion are limited because of the system of horizontal entry into higher grades. Allegations of bribery, attributable to the low pay and poor working conditions, have been widespread.
Since the late 1980s, women have entered in larger numbers into the higher echelons of the Indian police, mostly through the Indian Police Service system. Women police officers were first used in 1972, and a number of women hold key positions in various state police organizations. However, their absolute numbers, regardless of rank, are small. Uniformed and undercover women police officers have been deployed in New Delhi as the Anti-Eve Teasing Squad, which combats sexual harassment against women ("Eves"). Several women-only police stations have also been established in Tamil Nadu to handle sex crimes against women.
Police uniforms vary widely according to grade, region, and kind of duty performed. Among the armed police, uniforms tend to resemble army dress rather than conventional police uniforms. The khaki uniforms of the Indian Police Service officers are similar in all states, but headgear varies widely, especially among metropolitan areas.
The army has four major roles or functions in the maintenance of public order and internal security. One is to defend India's territorial integrity and to maintain the inviolability of its borders. Another involves dealing with internal security threats stemming from secessionist demands and externally supported insurgencies. The army also is called upon to assist civilian authorities in maintaining civil order when local police forces and the paramilitary prove inadequate to the task. Finally, the army can also be mobilized to deal with natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods, the only domestic function that the army performs with enthusiasm.
Despite the existence of numerous paramilitary forces, the army has had to quell outbreaks of civil violence, primarily in the states of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab (see Paramilitary Forces and Reserve Forces, this ch.). By the early 1990s, army involvement in Assam and Punjab had diminished significantly as insurgencies waned. However, the role of the army in Jammu and Kashmir expanded substantially as both police and paramilitary forces failed to maintain law and order.
In 1993 upper-echelon army officers warned that excessive use of the army to restore civil order might have a number of corrosive effects. First, it might damage the morale of troops who might be distressed at having to shoot civilians. Second, it might have the effect of politicizing the army. The outgoing chief of army staff, General Sunith Francis Rodrigues, publicly articulated his misgivings on this subject. Furthermore, in June 1993, Rodrigues presented a report entitled "Maximizing Effectiveness of Central Police Organizations" to the Committee of Secretaries (composed of a "core group", the secretaries of defence, finance, and home affair, chaired by the cabinet secretary, and meeting on a weekly basis). The report called for the army to take over the training of paramilitary forces.
Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Armed Forces
In response to a range of insurgencies since the early 1980s, the central government has enacted an extensive array of legislation that places substantial curbs on civil liberties. The National Security Act of 1980, the National Security Amendment Act of 1984, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 (which was renewed in 1987 and suspended in 1995), and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act of 1990 are the most significant laws in force. The ramifications of these four laws are sweeping. Under their aegis, the central government has the right of preventive detention, may seek in-camera trials, may send accused individuals before designated courts, and may destroy property belonging to suspected terrorists. Furthermore, under the terms of the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, members of the armed forces cannot be prosecuted for actions committed in good faith in pursuance of the provisions of this law.
During the 1980s and 1990s, both international and domestic human rights groups asserted that human rights violations are rampant. The principal international organizations making these allegations are the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Asia Watch. Two Indian counterparts are the People's Union for Civil Liberties and the People's United Democratic Front. Indian and foreign press reports have alleged that local police and paramilitary forces have engaged in rape, torture, and beatings of suspects in police custody. Numerous "militants" reportedly have simply disappeared in Jammu and Kashmir. On other occasions, especially in Punjab, security forces on various occasions allegedly captured insurgents and then shot them in staged "encounters" or "escapes." The government has either vigorously challenged these allegations or asserted that condign punishment had been meted out against offenders. The government has made efforts to blunt the barrage of domestic and foreign criticism. One such effort was the establishment of the five-member National Human Rights Commission in 1993 composed of senior retired judges. A report released by the commission in November 1993 cited eighty Bombay police officials for "atrocities, ill treatment, collusion, and connivance" and for "being openly on the side of the Hindu aggressors" during the December 1992 Hindu-Muslim riots. The commission's mandate does not extend to violations in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast India, and it must rely on state investigative agencies for its field work.
Kashmir
In the mid-1990s, India was grappling with three separate insurgencies of varying strengths in the states of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir has the most serious implications for India. The long-term roots of the Kashmir problem can be traced to the partition of India (see National Integration, ch. 1). The crisis centers on a militant secessionist demand that the Indian state has harshly suppressed. Its proximate causes are located in the central government's attempts to manipulate state-level politics for short-term political ends. Since 1989, approximately 10,000 civilians have died at the hands of security forces or militants. Although the origins of the crisis are quintessentially indigenous, there is widespread agreement among both Indian and foreign observers that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan has actively aided and abetted some of the insurgent groups, most notably, the radical Islamic Hezb-ul-Mujahideen.
The counterinsurgency strategy that the Indian government has adopted in Jammu and Kashmir was developed in the context of dealing with guerrilla movements in India's northeast in the late 1970s. This strategy involves denying the guerrillas any sanctuaries, sealing the porous Indo-Pakistani border, and using both army and paramilitary forces to conduct house-to-house "cordon-and-search" operations. Whether this strategy will lead eventually to the collapse of the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir remains an open question; violence has continued to accelerate since 1993, with mounting casualties on both sides and the destruction of an ancient mosque and shrine in 1995 (see Political Issues, ch. 8; South Asia, ch. 9).
Punjab
The insurgency in the state of Punjab originated in the late 1970s. The roots of this insurgency are complex. The Green Revolution, a package of agricultural inputs, transformed the socioeconomic landscape of Punjab (see The Green Revolution, ch. 7). Amidst this new-found prosperity, large numbers of Sikhs started to shed some of the trappings of their faith. This propensity rekindled an age-old fear in the Sikh community--that of being absorbed into the Hindu fold. In turn, many Punjabi Sikhs, who were dispossessed of their land as a consequence of agricultural transformation, found solace in various revivalistic practices. One of the leaders of this revivalistic movement was Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a politically ambitious itinerant Sikh preacher. The second factor contributing to the insurgency was the attempt by Indira Gandhi (India's prime minister, 1966-77 and 1980-84), the Congress, and from 1978 Congress (I) to use Bhindranwale to undermine the position of the Akali Dal (Eternal Party), a regional party (see Political Parties, ch. 8). Bhindranwale and his followers were encouraged to verbally intimidate Akali Dal politicians. Although this strategy met with some success, Bhindranwale and his followers became a source of mayhem and disruption in Punjab. Eventually, in June 1984, Gandhi had to order units of the Indian army to flush out Bhindranwale and his followers, who had taken refuge in the Golden Temple complex, Sikhism's most holy shrine, in Amritsar, Punjab (see Sikhism, ch. 3).
This exercise, Operation Bluestar, was, at best, a mixed success. After all efforts at negotiation failed, Indira Gandhi ordered the army to storm the temple. A variety of army units, along with substantial numbers of paramilitary forces, surrounded the temple complex on June 3, 1984. After the demands to surrender peacefully were met with volleys of gunfire from within the confines of the temple, the army was given the order to take the temple by force. Indian intelligence authorities had underestimated the firepower possessed by the militants, however, and the army brought in tanks and heavy artillery to suppress the antitank and machine-gun fire. After a twenty-four-hour firefight, the army successfully took control of the temple. According to Indian government sources, eighty-three army personnel were killed and 249 injured. Insurgent casualties were 493 killed and eighty-six injured. Indian observers assert that the number of Sikh casualties was probably higher.
The attack on the Golden Temple had the effect of inflaming significant segments of the Sikh community. It is widely believed that the two Sikh bodyguards who assassinated Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, were driven by their anger over the Golden Temple episode. In the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination, mobs rampaged through the streets of New Delhi and other parts of India over the next few days, killing several thousand Sikhs. The New Delhi police proved to be partisan observers and did little to stop or apprehend the rioters. Only after the deployment of the army, almost three days after the onset of the riots, was order fully restored.
The New Delhi riots had repercussions in Punjab as militants stepped up their activities. Gandhi's son and political successor, Rajiv Gandhi, sought unsuccessfully to bring peace to Punjab with an accord signed with Harchand Singh Longowal, a moderate Sikh leader. Rajiv Gandhi's successors, belonging to the Janata factions, proved to be no more adept at resolving the crisis. In fact, between 1987 and 1991, Punjab was placed under President's Rule and governed directly from New Delhi (see The Executive, ch. 8). Eventually, an election was held in the state in February 1992. Voter turnout, however, was poor; only about 24 percent of the population participated in the elections. Despite its narrow mandate, the newly elected Congress (I) government gave a free hand to the police chief of the state, K.P.S. Gill. His ruthless methods significantly weakened the insurgent movement. Most political observers, however, assert that long-term political stability in Punjab depends on addressing the underlying grievances of segments of the Sikh community.
Assam and the Northeast
The origins of the insurgency in Assam are quite different from those in Kashmir and Punjab. The principal grievance of the radical student movement, the United Liberation Front of Assam, is nativist. Front members are violently opposed to the presence of Bengalis from the neighboring state of West Bengal and waves of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Various rounds of negotiations between the United Liberation Front of Assam and two successive central governments resulted in the Assam Accord of August 15, 1985. Under the provisions of this accord, persons who entered the state illegally between January 1966 and March 1971 were allowed to remain but were disenfranchised for ten years, while those who entered after 1971 faced expulsion. A November 1985 amendment to the Indian citizenship law allows noncitizens who entered Assam between 1961 and 1971 to have all the rights of citizenship except the right to vote for a period of ten years.
In 1993 an accord was reached between the Bodo tribe and the central and state governments. The accord established the Bodoland Autonomous Council, which gave the Bodos limited political and administrative autonomy. Nevertheless, violence broke out in 1994: members of the Bodo Security Force, in the wake of demands for a "liberated Bodoland" burned several villages and killed around 100 immigrant villagers. Both local counterinsurgency forces and army units were sent in to engage the Bodo militants.
A number of other insurgencies in the northeast have required extensive use of army and paramilitary forces. Four states in particular have witnessed various insurgent and guerrilla movements. The first and perhaps the most significant insurgency originated in Nagaland in the early 1950s; it was eventually quelled in the early 1980s through a mixture of repression and cooptation. In 1993 Nagaland experienced recrudescent violence as two ethnic groups, the Nagas and the Kukis, engaged in brutal conflict with each other. Adding to India's internal unrest in this region were the links established between the Bodo insurgents in Assam and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which, in turn, had links to other active insurgent groups and, reportedly, operatives in Thailand.
In neighboring Manipur, militants organized under the aegis of the People's Liberation Army long fought to unite the Meitei tribes of Burma and Manipur into an independent state. This insurgent movement had been largely suppressed by the mid-1990s.
In Mizoram the Mizo National Front fought a running battle with the Indian security forces throughout the 1960s. As in Nagaland, this insurgency was suppressed in the early 1980s through a mixture of political concessions and harsh military tactics.
In the state of Tripura, tribal peoples organized under the leadership of the Tripura National Front were also responsible for terrorist activity. This movement has, for the most part, also been brought under control by the government.
The central government's success in quelling these insurgencies was not without human and material costs. Although no assessments of these costs exist in the public domain, it is widely believed that the paramilitary forces and the army were given a free hand in suppressing the uprisings. A prominent Indian human rights activist and attorney, Nandita Haksar, has alleged that harsh methods were routinely used, including collective punishment of villagers accused of harboring terrorists in remote areas. Because of the continued level of insurgency by Assamese and other groups, which had bases in neighboring Burma, India and Burma started joint counterinsurgency operations against the rebels in May 1995, the first such operations since the 1980s.
National-Level Agencies
The constitution assigns responsibility for maintaining law and order to the states and territories, and almost all routine policing--including apprehension of criminals--is carried out by state-level police forces. The constitution also permits the central government to participate in police operations and organization by authorizing the maintenance of the Indian Police Service. Police officers are recruited by the Union Public Service Commission through a competitive nationwide examination. On completion of a nationwide basic public-service course, police officer candidates attend the National Police Academy at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. They are then assigned to particular state or union territory forces, where they usually remain for the rest of their careers. About 50 percent of the officers are regularly assigned to states or territories other than their own in an effort to promote national integration.
The constitution also authorizes the central government to maintain whatever forces are necessary to safeguard national security. Under the terms of the constitution, paramilitary forces can be legally detailed to assist the states but only if so requested by the state governments. In practice, the central government has largely observed these limits. In isolated instances, the central government has deployed its paramilitary units to protect central government institutions over the protest of a state government. During the Emergency of 1975-77, the constitution was amended (effective February 1, 1976) to permit the central government to dispatch and deploy its paramilitary forces without regard to the wishes of the states (see The Rise of Indira Gandhi, ch. 1). This action proved unpopular, and the use of the paramilitary forces was controversial. After the Emergency was lifted, the constitution was amended in December 1978 to make deployment of central government paramilitary forces once again dependent on the consent of the state government. According to apologists for the central government, this amendment prevented the government from sending in paramilitary forces to protect the Babri Masjid (Babri Mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in December 1992 (see Public Worship, ch. 3).
The principal national-level organization concerned with law enforcement is the Ministry of Home Affairs, which supervises a large number of government functions and agencies operated and administered by the central government. The ministry is concerned with all matters pertaining to the maintenance of public peace and order, the staffing and administration of the public services, the delineation of internal boundaries, and the administration of union territories.
In addition to managing the Indian Police Service, the Ministry of Home Affairs maintains several agencies and organizations dealing with police and security. Police in the union territories are the responsibility of the Police Division, which also runs the National Police Academy and the Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science. The Central Bureau of Investigation investigates crimes that might involve public officials or have ramifications for several states. The ministry also is the parent organization of the Border Security Force.
State and Other Police Services
The Police Act of 1861 established the fundamental principles of organization for police forces in India, and, with minor modifications, continues in effect. Consequently, although state-level police forces are separate and may differ in terms of the quality of equipment and resources, their patterns of organization and operation are markedly similar.
An inspector general, answerable to the home secretary of the state, heads each state, union territory, or national capital territory police force. Under the inspector general are a number of police "ranges" composed of three to six districts, headed by deputy inspectors general. District police headquarters are commanded by superintendents. District superintendents have wide discretionary powers and are responsible for overseeing subordinate police stations as well as specialty elements, such as criminal investigation detachments, equipment storehouses and armories, and traffic police. Many large districts also have several assistant district superintendents.
Most preventive police work is carried out by constables assigned to police stations. Depending on the number of stations there, a district may be subdivided and, in some states, further divided into police "circles" to facilitate the supervision from district headquarters. Most of the major metropolitan areas such as New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras have separate municipal forces headed by commissioners. Police in the states and union territories are assisted by units of volunteer Home Guards, maintained under guidelines formulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
In most states and territories, police forces are functionally divided into civil (unarmed) police and armed contingents. The former staff police stations, conduct investigations, answer routine complaints, perform traffic duties, and patrol the streets. They usually carry lathis --bamboo staffs weighted or tipped with iron.
Contingents of armed police are divided into two groups, the district armed police and the Provincial Armed Constabulary. The district armed police are organized along the lines of an army infantry battalion. They are assigned to police stations and perform guard and escort duties. Those states that maintain distinct armed contingents employ them as a reserve strike force for emergencies. Such units are organized either as a mobile armed force under direct state control or in the case of district armed police (who are not as well equipped) as a force directed by district superintendents and generally used for riot-control duty.
The Provincial Armed Constabulary (Pradeshik) is an armed reserve maintained at key locations in some states and active only on orders from the deputy inspector general and higher-level authorities. Armed constabulary are not usually in contact with the public until they are assigned to VIP duty or assigned to maintain order during fairs, festivals, athletic events, elections, and natural disasters. They may also be sent to quell outbreaks of student or labor unrest, organized crime, and communal riots; to maintain key guard posts; and to participate in antiterrorist operations. Depending on the type of assignment, the Provincial Armed Constabulary may carry only lathis .
At all levels, the senior police officers answer to the police chain of command and respond to the general direction and control of designated civilian officials. In the municipal force, the chain of command runs directly to the state home secretary rather than to the district superintendent or district officials.
Working conditions and pay are poor, especially in the lower echelons of the police forces. Recruits receive only around Rs1,900 per month (about US$64). Opportunities for promotion are limited because of the system of horizontal entry into higher grades. Allegations of bribery, attributable to the low pay and poor working conditions, have been widespread.
Since the late 1980s, women have entered in larger numbers into the higher echelons of the Indian police, mostly through the Indian Police Service system. Women police officers were first used in 1972, and a number of women hold key positions in various state police organizations. However, their absolute numbers, regardless of rank, are small. Uniformed and undercover women police officers have been deployed in New Delhi as the Anti-Eve Teasing Squad, which combats sexual harassment against women ("Eves"). Several women-only police stations have also been established in Tamil Nadu to handle sex crimes against women.
Police uniforms vary widely according to grade, region, and kind of duty performed. Among the armed police, uniforms tend to resemble army dress rather than conventional police uniforms. The khaki uniforms of the Indian Police Service officers are similar in all states, but headgear varies widely, especially among metropolitan areas.
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